Challenge 3: Badge, Please!
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Introduction
Traditional cloud workloads often share service accounts across multiple services. If a service account is overprivileged or credentials leak, attackers can access unrelated corporate data.
Agent Identity solves this by providing an identity tied directly to the lifecycle of each agent. Unlike standard service accounts:
- Agent identities cannot be shared across multiple unrelated workloads.
- They cannot be impersonated from untrusted environments.
- Tokens are bound to the agent’s unique cryptographic certificate via Context-Aware Access (CAA) and mTLS, making stolen tokens un-replayable.
In this challenge, you will govern your deployed agent by configuring its Agent Identity and granting precise, least-privilege permissions.
Description
Enable agent identity for your agent, find its principal and grant it the permission to access the Firestore database. Run the seed-cloud-database.sh script before you test your agent.
Warning
Make sure that you’re updating your deployed agent, do not re-create it;agents-clihas a specific parameter for that.
Success Criteria
- The deployed agent has an active Agent Identity configured on Agent Runtime.
- Granular IAM role bindings are attached to the agent’s identity principal following the principle of least privilege.
- Verified that all tool invocations and telemetry events in Cloud Logging / Cloud Trace are attributed to the Agent Identity principal.
- No code was modified.